Embodied Social Cognition


In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general hypotheses about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject these claims. Thus, the case for embodied social cognition fails. Moreover, to the extent that general arguments forembodied cognition rest on these premises, they are correspondingly uncompelling. 


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Department of Philosophy

Oklahoma State University

© 2015 by Shannon Spaulding