Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Metaphysics and Epistemology is a broad, impressive, and interesting collection of essays on the nature of implicit bias. It presents various views on the kind of cognitive states that underlie implicit bias; how to interpret the results of methodological tools that purport to measure implicit bias; the relation to stereotypes, stereotype threat, and epistemic injustice; and application to philosophical skepticism, underrepresentation of women in science, and gendered stereotypes about philosophy. In this review, I shall not offer complete summaries of each chapter. I refer readers interested in that kind of information to the editors’ introductory chapter. Instead, I will focus on how to think of and use this volume in light of the rapidly developing empirical and theoretical research on implicit bias. My task here is to explain the ways in which the literature has changed, and how this is (or in some cases is not) reflected in the contributions to this book. Overall, these chapters provide accessible, insightful perspectives on some of the enduring debates in the field of implicit bias, and the book promises to be a useful guide to these debates for years to come.
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